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In Canada, inﬂation targeting is widely agreed to have been a success story, but 
questions about how the regime might be ﬁne-tuned in 2011 remain open. This 
Commentary asks how much discretion an inﬂation-targeting Bank of Canada 
can be allowed without compromising the credibility of its low inﬂation goal, and 
suggests a two-pronged approach to reﬁning its procedures. One prong strengthens 
the commitment to inﬂation control by tightening the explicit  design of the 
targeting framework, and the other adds policy ﬂexibility.
Three speciﬁc suggestions are developed:
•   The inﬂation target should be moved down to, say, zero to 2 percent, and 2 
percent should become a cap on inﬂation that triggers a policy reaction, once 
inﬂation threatens to breach this bound. These changes would strengthen the 
Bank’s commitment to price stability and more ﬁrmly anchor the public’s inﬂa-
tion expectations. They might also lead to the Bank taking a more proactive 
role in response to ﬁnancial market developments.
•  Policy ﬂexibility should be enhanced by permitting variation in the time horizon 
over which the inﬂation target is regained after a deviation. Large shocks could 
provide a rationale for lengthening this horizon, for example, but should the 
Bank resort to such event-contingent ﬂexibility, it should offer an explicit justi-
ﬁcation for doing so and commit to a speciﬁc path for returning to the target.
•  Explicit inﬂation-forecast targeting should be adopted. This would improve 
the transparency of policy decisions and establish better communication 
between the Bank and the public. Such targeting would involve regularly 
updating a forecast time path for inﬂation and for the interest-rate changes 
needed to achieve it. The publication of such a conditional time path for 
future policy would help to anchor the public’s inﬂation expectations more 
ﬁrmly, and also make it easier to monitor policy and hence hold the Bank  
of Canada accountable for any deviations from what seems optimal in the  
light of past and current circumstances.
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  I would like to thank the participants of the conference “Canada’s Monetary Policy Regime after 2011,” organized by the C.D. Howe  
Institute, for their comments. Discussions with Marcello Estevao, David Laidler, Angie Redish, Bill Robson and Gregor Smith greatly im-
proved the exposition of this Commentary.
1  Murray (2006), reviewing the performance of inﬂation-targeting countries over the past two decades, argues that ﬂexibility in targeting has 
increased somewhat over time. This could be explained simply by the fact that such a regime has to be quite rigid initially in order to start 
anchoring inﬂation expectations at a low level. Notwithstanding, there remains the question of what degree of ﬂexibility a well-established, 
mature targeting regime can afford.
 2  Survey-based measures of long-term inﬂation seem to have stabilized at 2 percent (see, for example, Bank of Canada 2006). Spreads between 
real and nominal bonds also have shown less volatility, even though one has to be careful in interpreting this evidence as reﬂecting more  
credible monetary policy (see, for example, Christensen, Dion, and Reid 2004).
3  See Bank of Canada (2006) for an outline of the issues regarding the overhaul of the targeting regime in 2011.
T
he issue of ﬂexibility is at the 
centre of any targeting regime 
used to conduct monetary 
policy. Such a regime is often 
described as a form of “constrained 
discretion” in that it is designed to 
constrain a central bank to achieve 
low and stable inﬂation, while 
allowing it some freedom to react in a 
discretionary, but transparent fashion 
to shocks that hit the economy. 
But once a central bank has established low inﬂa-
tion, how much discretion can it really afford with-
out compromising its reputation for low inﬂation?1  
In Canada, inﬂation targeting has been a success 
story since its inception in 1991. The targeting 
regime successfully reduced inﬂation, as measured 
by the consumer price index, to a level close to 2 
percent. More important, the market perceived the 
commitment to this target as credible. By 1998, 
inﬂation expectations had started to fall well within 
the range of 1 to 3 percent in which the Bank of 
Canada intends to keep inﬂation in the medium 
run. And throughout the past decade, those 
expectations have remained well within this range 
(see Figures 1 and 2).2 With inﬂation now cred-
ibly anchored at the 2 percent target, discussion 
has shifted toward the need to ﬁne-tune Canada’s 
monetary policy regime.3 This Commentary revisits 
the question of how ﬂexible inﬂation targeting 
should be, and derives implications for the review 
of Canada’s targeting regime in 2011.
 Flexibility for a targeting regime comes in 
different forms. An important one concerns  
whether the central bank should pursue goals 
other than inﬂation. The overriding opinion in 
the academic literature is that commitment to 
low and stable inﬂation either takes precedence 
over other goals (such as high output and employ-
ment) or is complementary to other goals (such as 
ﬁnancial stability). But an equally important ques-
tion is how best to implement and maintain such 
a commitment. Ideally, the design of Canada’s 
future targeting regime will reﬂect an optimal 
degree of ﬂexibility. Details such as the horizon 
over which to achieve the target, or when devia-
tions from the target are possible, can help balance 
the need for active policymaking with the value of 
being committed to low inﬂation. 
These considerations suggest a two-pronged 
approach for ﬁne-tuning Canada’s targeting 
regime. One prong is to put even more emphasis 
on keeping inﬂation under control and to signal 
this in a simple fashion by tightening the design 
of the targeting framework. The other prong is 
to add the right ﬂexibility to the framework by 
providing room for discretion when it is most 
needed: a ﬂexible horizon for achieving the target 
in response to large shocks.
This Commentary offers three speciﬁc sugges-
tions for improving the Bank of Canada’s target-
ing regime.
•    The level of the inﬂation target should be 
reevaluated. Moving the band down to, say, 
zero to 2 percent and emphasizing a cap on 
inﬂation at 2 percent seems to be an improve-
ment over the current regime. A cap should 
be understood here as a trigger for a policy 
reaction, once inﬂation threatens to breach 
the upper bound of the band. This would 
strengthen the Bank’s commitment to price 
stability and anchor people’s inﬂation expec-| 2  Commentary 293
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Figure 2: Measures of Inﬂation Expectations, 1990 – 2006
1. Forecast 6 to 10 years ahead taken from the semi-annual survey by Consensus Economics Inc.
2. Interest rate differential on 30-year nominal and Real Return bonds (weekly).
Source: Bank of Canada. 2006. “Renewal of Inﬂation Control Target – Background Information.” November. Page 5.
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Figure 1: Consumer Price Index, 1975 – 2005
Note:      Total CPI inﬂation is affected temporarily by changes in indirect taxes. The February 1994 tobacco cut reduced CPI inﬂation by 1.3 percent in 1994, and the July one-percent-
age-point cut in the Goods and Services Tax (net of a small contribution from two excise tax increases) reduced CPI inﬂation by 0.5 percentage points.
Source: Bank of Canada. 2006. “Renewal of Inﬂation Control Target – Background Information.” November. Page 4.Commentary 293    | 3
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tations more ﬁrmly. It could also lead to a 
more proactive role in response to ﬁnancial 
market developments.
•    Flexibility for policy decisions could be 
retained by varying the horizon over which 
to achieve the target. Large shocks – for 
example, ones that threaten ﬁnancial stability 
– could provide the rationale for lengthening 
the horizon, thus allowing for a temporary 
deviation from a tighter cap. Such a ﬂexible 
event-contingent horizon, however, would 
require both a justiﬁcation for any deviation 
and a commitment to a transition path that 
speciﬁes how to return to the target over the 
horizon.
Inﬂation-forecast targeting (explained below) 
could improve the transparency of policy decisions 
and establish better communication. Outlining 
a conditional path for future policy responses 
would help to anchor inﬂation expectations more 
ﬁrmly when making a policy decision. It would 
also improve the enforcement of the targeting 
regime by revealing to the public any deviations 
from optimal policy actions in the light of past and 
current circumstances.
The Commentary is organized as follows. It 
begins with a discussion of what ﬂexibility means 
in the context of a targeting regime. It then 
continues with a review of the academic literature 
dealing with the goals monetary policy should 
pursue. Less theoretically inclined readers might 
wish to refer only to the summary at the end of 
this section; others might beneﬁt from the short 
appendix at the end of the paper that outlines 
a common theoretical framework for assessing 
monetary policy. The Commentary concludes with 
a discussion of whether the current parameters of 
Canada’s inﬂation-targeting framework are appro-
priate, and reviews the target band, the horizon 
for the target, and its enforcement.
Three Types of Flexibility for a 
Targeting Regime
It is useful ﬁrst to clarify what ﬂexibility means 
within a targeting regime (a more formal 
development of some of the ideas presented here is 
given in the appendix). In general, there are three 
different layers of ﬂexibility within a targeting 
regime. The ﬁrst is the most elementary, and 
concerns the goals of monetary policy. The second 
layer refers to how a regime should achieve these 
goals, while the third layer refers to the actual 
implementation of these goals within the regime. 
Goals other than Inﬂation
Flexibility can mean that monetary policy has 
objectives other than low and stable inﬂation. One 
can readily think here of an employment or output 
goal, but recent events have highlighted other 
relevant ends, such as exchange-rate stability or 
ﬁnancial stability. Such goals for monetary policy 
can be derived from efﬁciency considerations or, 
alternatively, can be taken as mandated for the 
central bank by the political environment.4 While 
the ﬁrst approach corresponds to the economist’s 
notion of optimal monetary policy, the second does 
not and serves mostly as a description of actual 
central bank behaviour.
A different distinction can be made between 
mandated (de jure) objectives and actual (de facto) 
objectives that the central bank pursues. De jure 
objectives are important, as they give a bench-
mark for holding the central bank accountable. 
A central bank, however, will often pursue other, 
intermediate or auxiliary goals that help it to 
achieve its mandate.5 
Once the objective for a central bank includes 
some measure of inﬂation, the policy regime is 
often labelled as one that targets inﬂation. If it 
also contains other variables, it is often called a 
4  One example is an “overambitious” (that is, inﬂationary) employment goal (see Svensson (1997b) who analyzes inﬂation targeting when a 
central bank receives such a mandate). Even though some inefﬁciencies or distortions could rationalize such a goal, it is reasonable to suggest 
that it is better to remove them at their source rather than through monetary policy. It is for this reason that I do not pursue the second view 
further here.
5  The Bank of Canada seeks to “contribute to solid economic performance and rising living standards for Canadians by keeping inﬂation low, 
stable and predictable” (see http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/about/do.html). This low inﬂation objective is only tenuously related to the 
Bank’s formal mandate as set out in the Bank of Canada Act. See Robson (2009, pp 1.2). To the contrary, the Federal Reserve has the more 
equally weighted objective of pursuing growth and low inﬂation, which derives from its governing legislation.| 4  Commentary 293
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ﬂexible targeting regime. The degree of ﬂexibility 
then becomes an issue of how to weigh the differ-
ent goals within the central bank’s objective (see, 
for example, Svensson 1999). Tradeoffs among 
different goals depend on one’s view of how policy 
and the economy interact and what type of shocks 
the economy faces. Ideally, then, these weights can 
be linked to some fundamentals in the economy, 
hence corresponding again to a notion of optimal 
policy. Alternatively, these weights can be viewed 
as imposed upon the central bank purely by politi-
cal considerations.
In so far as achieving the goals involves a so-
called time-consistency problem for the central 
bank, the weights themselves become design 
variables for a targeting regime. Such a problem 
arises whenever the central bank cannot commit 
to follow a particular conduct of policy and when-
ever there are incentives for it to deviate from 
such rules in order to realize short-term gains that 
are not optimal from a long-run perspective. By 
manipulating the weights, it is possible to curb 
ﬂexibility, thereby realigning the central bank’s 
incentives with the optimal long-run policy. For 
example, if one is concerned about future political 
pressure on the central bank to increase inﬂation 
in order to stabilize output, one could increase the 
emphasis on inﬂation in the bank’s mandate.
Conditional Policy Rules
The second element of ﬂexibility in a targeting 
regime refers to a description of how to achieve 
these different goals. Once an objective has been 
accepted as guidance for optimal policy, the task 
arises to formulate actual policy rules that enable 
the central bank to achieve its objective in light 
of shocks to the economy. In general, a policy 
rule speciﬁes actions in a forward-looking manner 
as a function of past policy decisions, current 
circumstances, and projections into the future 
(see, for example, Woodford 2003). Actual policy 
is thus a full description of future actions that will 
be taken in response to economic developments. 
This aspect is especially important for a situation 
where long-run gains of commitment to a rule 
are endangered by short-run considerations. 
Nonetheless, ﬂexibility arises here in the sense 
that there is unlikely to be a single optimal, 
unconditional level for the variables that policy 
targets. Hence, a rule usually will give the central 
bank some leeway in its policymaking to achieve 
its speciﬁc objective (see, for example, Bernanke 
and Mishkin 1997). 
The description of this optimal policy is likely 
to depend on the speciﬁc circumstances prevail-
ing when it is taken. That is, it is ﬂexible or state 
dependent, as it depends on how shocks impact 
the economy through time and how the economy 
reacts to the monetary policy action in the wake 
of these shocks. For example, a central bank will 
react differently to an increase in demand that is 
temporary and one that is relatively persistent. The 
central bank is likely to set its policy depending 
on how much pressure this increase will put on 
inﬂation – in other words, on how the state of the 
economy evolves. Similarly, the change in mone-
tary policy required to keep inﬂation on track will 
depend on how much the economy reacts to it.
But this raises the more important issue that 
current optimal policy will depend on previous 
policy decisions, therefore being history dependent. 
To continue with the example, it might be opti-
mal to react slowly to an increase in demand at 
ﬁrst, following with further interest rate increases 
later. Suppose the economy reacts sharply to the 
initial change in interest rates, because there are 
expectations of further increases. Then, it would 
be still necessary and optimal to raise rates further 
in order to fulﬁll these expectations. If, in the 
meantime, some shocks affect demand negatively, 
any potential lowering of interest rates would have 
to take into account that interest rates originally 
were to rise further. Such dependence clariﬁes the 
reason inﬂation targeting is commonly regarded as 
a form of “constrained discretion.”
Flexibility thus raises additional concerns of 
uncertainty and imperfect information at the time 
when a central bank makes its decisions. It is often 
the case that the nature and severity of shocks 
affecting the economy are uncertain or that infor-
mation about how the economy adjusts through 
time to both shocks and policy emerges only with 
a lag. While these concerns tend to work against Commentary 293    | 5
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ﬂexibility in terms of what goals the central bank 
should pursue, they are of particular importance 
when the bank has an informational advantage 
over the general public. In this context, ﬂexibil-
ity pins down how much monetary policy can 
and should rely on private information – that is, 
information that the general public does not have 
access to or cannot verify – without compromis-
ing the public’s perception of the central bank’s 
commitment to long-run optimal policy.
Implementing an Inﬂation Target
When a central bank makes an actual inﬂation 
target operational, the framework itself can be 
designed in a manner sufﬁciently ﬂexible to take 
implicit account of considerations other than 
inﬂation. At the heart of the framework are the 
variable to target (for example, core inﬂation) 
and the level (for example, 2 percent per annum) 
the bank commits to achieve. But monetary 
policy need not explicitly specify secondary 
targets; instead, it can rely on other parameters 
that implicitly account for them. For example, 
the framework could specify an acceptable range 
or upper bound for inﬂation rather than using 
a point target of inﬂation (a regime sometimes 
called “strict targeting”). The time horizon over 
which to achieve the goal is another important 
element, with longer horizons allowing for a more 
gradual response to inﬂation and, hence, more 
concern for other variables. The framework could 
even lay down the circumstances under which 
deviations from the target are possible. Of course, 
these details are driven by the answers found in the 
ﬁrst two layers, and thus will reﬂect the tradeoff 
between ﬂexibility and commitment in the design 
of optimal monetary policy.6
A well-designed targeting framework should 
also outline the extent to which the central bank 
communicates its policy stance to the public. 
Requiring the bank  to communicate details of 
its policy stance tends to restrict the ﬂexibility 
of policymaking, as it often pins down a (mostly 
conditional) path of further actions. As with all 
other parameters, ﬂexibility ultimately depends on 
how independent the central bank is and how well 
the actual regime is enforced. A targeting regime 
might appear strict on the surface, even though 
political inﬂuence combined with weak enforce-
ment leads to frequent misses of the target. 
Monetary Policy Goals and Inﬂation 
Targeting
A general consensus has emerged in the academic 
literature that the overriding goal of monetary 
policy should be low inﬂation and that any 
persistent deviation from a long-run average level 
of inﬂation close to zero will lead to negative 
consequences for the economy. In particular, 
economists tend to agree that expansionary 
monetary policy cannot increase the trend of 
output or employment in the long run but instead 
will result in higher inﬂation and often lower 
growth for the economy even if, for political 
reasons, it is meant to counteract some inefﬁciency 
or market failure that affects the trend.
There is a lack of consensus, however, about 
whether it is optimal to stabilize inﬂation perfectly 
around a low average level or to permit tempo-
rary deviations from this level. This is based on 
the idea that monetary policy can help to allevi-
ate impediments to well-functioning markets 
that amplify the effect of shocks to the economy 
or prevent the economy from responding efﬁ-
ciently to such shocks. In such an approach, the 
goals for monetary policy are usually derived from 
fundamentals such as society’s preferences over 
economic outcomes and a particular model of 
the economy. A case can be made for three other 
goals: output stabilization, exchange-rate stability, 
and ﬁnancial stability.
6   There are, of course, other important details, which this Commentary does not discuss. One concerns the price index to target, a topic dis-
cussed by Parkin (2009) and Smith (2009).| 6  Commentary 293
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Output
Stabilizing output around some trend is the 
additional goal for monetary policy most 
discussed in the literature. In general, one can 
rationalize such a goal by deriving it from a 
welfare perspective (see the appendix). The simple 
objective for a central bank is then given by 
minimizing, with appropriately chosen measures, 
the volatility of both inﬂation and output around 
some long-run trend. The central bank takes the 
trend as given – for inﬂation, some low level, 
and for output, the natural rate of output, or 
some measure of potential output growth driven 
by productivity gains – and chooses its policy 
response to stabilize both variables around it. 
As long as there is no tradeoff between the two 
goals, it is optimal to stabilize inﬂation perfectly 
and to achieve it by stabilizing the output gap – the 
difference between actual output and its natural 
rate – at zero. For example, a surge in demand 
will lead to a positive output gap, where actual 
output exceeds its natural rate, which puts upward 
pressure on prices. Removing this excess demand 
will stabilize prices automatically. More gener-
ally, removing all excess ﬂuctuations beyond the 
ones captured by output trend – in other words, 
keeping the output gap at zero – stabilizes inﬂa-
tion. Hence, there is no conﬂict between the two 
goals, and making inﬂation stabilization the exclu-
sive goal is optimal. Even though there is strong 
evidence that both inﬂation and output variability 
have declined simultaneously, there is an increas-
ing consensus that this cannot be attributed neces-
sarily to the goals’ being complementary7 but that 
a basic conﬂict between these two goals remains, 
especially at low rates of inﬂation.
A short-run tradeoff could arise because of 
shocks that affect inﬂation and the output gap in 
different ways. Such shocks are often perceived 
as shifting the Phillips curve that describes this 
tradeoff and are thus different from fundamental 
demand or supply (that is, productivity) shocks. 
To analyze the tradeoff correctly, one must specify 
the relative weights given to inﬂation and output. 
Ideally, a structural model of the economy is 
available to link the weights to fundamentals of 
the economy and empirically estimate them. In 
general, weights given to output are estimated to 
be relatively small, and they should be thought of 
strictly as an upper bound for various reasons.
The foremost reason for favouring a relatively 
large weight for inﬂation stabilization is a basic 
problem of commitment. If a central bank cannot 
commit to its future actions, it will place more 
weight on output stabilization than would be best 
from the perspective of long-run optimal policy. 
This so-called stabilization bias can be removed by 
lowering the weight on output, thereby increasing 
the policy response to deviations from the inﬂation 
target.8 Interestingly, when shocks to the economy 
become more persistent, the commitment problem 
becomes more severe, and there is a more press-
ing need to focus on the targeted inﬂation rate. 
If actual policy concentrates more on inﬂation, it 
signals a credible commitment to optimal policy 
and anchors expectations – and thus inﬂation itself 
– more ﬁrmly on the intended level.
The commitment problem is often compounded 
by the fact that a central bank has better infor-
mation than the public about the state of the 
economy. This information is private in the sense 
that, even with a lag, the general public cannot 
verify it. One can think of the central bank’s fore-
casts as private information that cannot be cred-
ibly communicated to the public. A tradeoff then 
emerges where the beneﬁts from letting the central 
bank react to such information are compared with 
the cost of monetary policy’s deviating from its 
long-run optimal policy to realize short-run gains 
under the pretext of some information that cannot 
be veriﬁed. Optimal monetary policy in such a 
situation can be shown to correspond to a form of 
bounded discretion implemented through a cap 
7  Blanchard and Simon (2001), for example, document a simultaneous drop in both output and inﬂation variability in the United States start-
ing in the 1980s. This “great moderation” is sometimes attributed to a better conduct of monetary policy, whereas others point to lower vari-
ability in shocks (most recently, Smets and Wouters 2007) or to a change in the monetary policy regime (Nason and Smith 2007) as possible 
explanations.
8   The traditional commitment problem in monetary policy is given by an inﬂation bias that arises whenever policy tries to increase output 
beyond the trend determined by productivity growth.Commentary 293    | 7
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or upper bound on inﬂation: as long as inﬂation 
is below a certain threshold, policy is allowed to 
stimulate output at the cost of higher inﬂation. 
Interestingly, this bound becomes more restrictive 
the more severe the problem of commitment and 
private information.9 
A further caveat concerning trading off inﬂa-
tion and the output gap is the high degree of 
uncertainty associated with measuring the latter. 
Uncertainty about the type of shocks hitting 
the economy – for example, productivity versus 
shocks that alter the tradeoff between unemploy-
ment and inﬂation – is likely to lead to large 
deviations of the perceived gap from the actual 
gap. Simulation studies show that it can be better 
in such a situation to shift the emphasis of policy 
back towards inﬂation (see Ehrmann and Smets 
2003). Similarly, one is often uncertain about the 
structure of the economy – and, hence, about 
the way monetary policy affects it – or about 
the parameters underlying the model of the real 
economy that forms the basis for policy deci-
sions.10 Unfortunately, no general consensus has 
yet emerged in the literature about whether this 
last type of uncertainty calls for a more cautious or 
more aggressive response to inﬂation.11 
This leads to the conclusion that a central 
bank should place relative little weight on output 
stabilization relative to inﬂation. It also conﬁrms 
the wisdom of  “erring on the safe side” by shift-
ing the primary focus of policy to inﬂation if the 
bank has incomplete information on the struc-
ture of the economy and the shocks affecting it. 
These principles receive further support from the 
fact that rules including some appropriate measure 
of inﬂation – and to a much lesser degree some 
measure of the change in the output gap across 
periods rather than the output gap itself – are 
good, approximate optimal policy descriptions 
across different possible models of the economy. 
Hence, robust optimal policy tends to emphasize 
control of inﬂation.12
Exchange Rates
Targeting (or even pegging) the exchange rate 
necessarily sacriﬁces some monetary independence. 
Monetary policy then cannot react to domestic 
inﬂation pressures but instead must adopt to 
a large degree the policy stance of the country 
against whose currency its own is pegged. This 
compromises price stability if there is an inﬂation 
bias in that country. In general, it is also difﬁcult 
to determine the appropriate (that is, the efﬁcient) 
level of the exchange rate and maintain it against 
market forces. This is particularly a problem if there 
are large, periodic swings in the real exchange rate.13 
The consensus in the literature seems to be 
that reacting directly to exchange-rate movements 
leads (if at all) only to small gains and might 
even compromise other goals (see, for example, 
Taylor 2001; and Gali and Monacelli 2005). 
Furthermore, inﬂation targeting already takes 
into account exchange-rate movements, at least 
implicitly, depending on what price index has 
been chosen as the target. In general, one should 
target a price index that reﬂects the relationship 
between the output gap and price stability. This 
implies that goods whose prices are more ﬂexible 
should receive less weight in the index, as supply 
for such goods tends to equal demand and, hence, 
their output gap is close to zero. In an interna-
tional context, the price index one targets should 
thus depend on the openness of the economy as 
measured by the pass-through of exchange-rate 
movements. With high-pass through, prices of 
imported goods respond quickly to changes in the 
exchange rate. The larger the pass-through, the 
9  See Canzoneri (1985) and Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) for a description of the problem and the optimal (time-consistent) policy solu-
tion, respectively.
10  For a basic discussion of how these considerations inﬂuence inﬂation targeting, see Svensson (1999).
11  Using the principle to safeguard against the least favourable model, however, hints at the latter, implying a lower relative weight on output 
(Giannoni 2002).
12  On this point, Giannoni and Woodford (2004) show that the structure of optimal monetary policy does not change across different models 
of the economy, with some measure of inﬂation and changes in the output gap at the centre of the optimal targeting rule.
13  In Canada, such swings seem to have become more important as the economy’s dependence on the commodities sector has increased.| 8  Commentary 293
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more appropriate it is to target a purely domestic 
price index (see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler 2001; and Corsetti and Pesenti 2005). 
Even though pass-through has declined recently in 
many countries, including Canada, this need not 
be attributed to prices having become less ﬂexible; 
it could simply be a consequence of better mone-
tary policy which lowers the need for frequent 
price adjustments. Hence, one needs to be 
cautious in interpreting this fact as an argument 
in favour for a price index that takes into account 
import prices and hence, indirectly, exchange-rate 
movements (see Devereaux and Yetman 2003).
When the exchange rate moves, there are direct 
and indirect effects on aggregate demand. Hence, 
concentrating exclusively on inﬂation and aggre-
gate demand forces monetary policy to evaluate 
the factors that cause exchange rates to change. As 
such, it contributes to the choice of the appropri-
ate policy reaction depending on the nature and 
persistence of the exchange-rate shock. For exam-
ple, an appreciation in the exchange rate could 
signal an increase for domestic goods or more 
foreign direct investment, but it could also simply 
be linked to speculation or to a temporary shift in 
ﬁnancial portfolios towards the domestic currency. 
While these shocks are associated with similar 
exchange-rate movements, they might require 
different policy responses: the former has a direct 
positive impact on aggregate demand, but the 
latter has only an indirect negative impact where 
the appreciation makes exports temporarily more 
expensive. If policy places a lot of emphasis on an 
exchange-rate target, however, both developments 
require similar policy responses. In Canada, this 
discussion has often been framed as the distinction 
between so-called “Type 1” and “Type 2” move-
ments in the exchange rate.14 Some commentators 
doubt that it is possible to make such a distinction 
consistently calling into question its usefulness as a 
policy guideline (see for example Robson 2009).
This still leaves open the question of whether a 
central bank should react to a persistent misalign-
ment of its currency with that of a major trading 
partner. It has been argued that optimal monetary 
policy should take this into account when setting 
interest rates (see, for example, Engel 2008). 
When exporters set their prices in local curren-
cies, prices for the same good can differ across 
countries. In the aggregate, this causes price 
levels – and hence the exchange rate and aggre-
gate demand – to be out of line with fundamen-
tals across countries. Monetary policy should 
then remove this problem. Most interestingly, 
when a home currency is overvalued but inﬂa-
tion runs high, there is a conﬂict for an inﬂation-
targeting central bank between these two goals. 
Nonetheless, critics point out that it is usually 
impossible to determine when and by how much 
currencies are misaligned.15 An alleged misalign-
ment then might just provide a convenient excuse 
for discretionary policy. 
Financial Stability
The central banks of all major industrialized 
countries state that ﬁnancial stability is an 
important goal alongside the control of inﬂation. 
On the surface, there is no conﬂict between 
these two goals. Indeed, a commitment to stable 
inﬂation at a low level is a prerequisite for a sound 
and stable ﬁnancial system: it aids long-term 
ﬁnancial planning and reduces excess volatility in 
nominal asset prices and interest rates that could 
arise in the wake of policy uncertainty.
Stabilizing inﬂation in the short run, however, 
involves perhaps frequent changes in the policy 
instrument – typically, a short-term interest 
rate. Such changes tend to feed into other inter-
est rates, especially in a regime where monetary 
policy is credibly committed to stabilize inﬂation 
perfectly. This, in turn, is likely to increase volatil-
ity in asset prices and interest rates, with negative 
consequences for ﬁnancial planning by ﬁrms and 
households.
14  In the context of Canada’s targeting regime, Ragan (2005) provides a detailed discussion of how monetary policy should take into account 
these different types of exchange-rate movements.
15  To take this argument further, monetary policy actually should react to a misalignment of its currency with a basket of currencies, where the 
weights reﬂect the importance of a particular trading partner. Such an approach is hard to implement, however, as the basket would need 
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These considerations have led to suggestions 
that monetary policy should aim for reduced 
interest-rate volatility in a tradeoff with perfect 
and immediate stabilization of inﬂation. Inertial 
responses and the associated gradualism of mone-
tary policy thus have become important elements 
of inﬂation targeting. It is noteworthy, however, 
that this does not mean compromising inﬂation as 
an overriding concern for monetary policy. Suppose 
a central bank can commit to its future policy 
actions and that people’s expectations are forward 
looking. It then would be possible to spread out the 
response of interest rates over the time necessary 
to bring inﬂation back to the targeted level. In this 
way, one could avoid sharp moves in interest rates 
precisely because people would anticipate further 
changes in interest rates in the future. Hence, inﬂa-
tion targeting by its very nature allows for smooth 
changes in interest rates.16
Another concern for central banks is whether to 
react to asset-price developments. The danger here 
is that a run-up in asset prices with a subsequent 
collapse – a so-called boom-bust cycle – causes a 
severe recession in the economy. The conventional 
wisdom has been that a central bank should not 
react to such asset-price movements, as it would 
have to infer the reasons prices increase in the 
ﬁrst half of the cycle. If underlying productivity 
growth has accelerated, monetary policy should be 
accommodative, while a departure of asset prices 
from fundamentals would call for sharp increases 
in rates (for a review of these arguments, see 
Detken and Smets 2004). Furthermore, policy-
makers often cannot detect whether asset prices 
are deviating from fundamentals in the early 
stages of the cycle, when policy would be most 
effective against potential asset-price bubbles. As a 
consequence, policymakers would be condemned 
to take a sit-and-wait approach during the run-up 
in prices, and to clean up after the bust in order to 
weaken the macroeconomic impact of the asset-
price collapse.
In the wake of the US subprime mortgage crisis, 
however, such an asymmetric response – leaning 
against sharp asset-price declines, but not against 
sharp increases – has been challenged, and argu-
ments for a more proactive response have again 
started to emerge (see, for example, Issing 2008). 
Such a response would always react against any 
sharp and prolonged move in asset prices, taking 
the edge off such a development irrespective of 
its rationale. A different approach would require 
a central bank to use additional information to 
evaluate asset-price developments and to react to 
sharp and prolonged increases in asset prices that 
are unlikely to be productivity related. Looking 
at credit growth and monetary aggregates that 
describe the amount of liquidity beyond aggre-
gate demand and inﬂation forecasts can yield 
additional information for monetary policy to 
react appropriately (see Christiano, Motto, and 
Rostagno 2007). 
An intriguing argument has been made in favour 
of incorporating asset prices into a broader price 
index called a dynamic price index, which would be 
appropriate for anyone who wished to index retire-
ment income to protect against future increases in 
the cost of living (see Reis 2006). Such an index 
could be targeted by a central bank, since a target-
ing regime in any case is supposed to protect the 
real wealth of households and provide a sound basis 
for long-run ﬁnancial planning, and thus could be 
a partial solution to how monetary policy should 
take into account asset-price movements.
Finally, any large shock that threatens the 
entire ﬁnancial system (a systemwide shock) or 
that causes a defaulting institution to endan-
ger the survival of other ﬁnancial institutions (a 
contagious or systemic shock) requires a prompt 
response by the central bank. In such a situation, 
the bank has to provide either ample liquidity or 
even longer-term credit to ﬁnancial institutions 
unconditionally. As long as these measures involve 
a mere redistribution of liquidity, these activities 
are neutral and do not compromise price stability. 
If, however, the central bank absorbs or reduces 
private losses, the goal of price stability arguably 
might be compromised, at least temporarily, as 
16  Another argument for keeping interests stable instead of adjusting them aggressively downward is the effect of a zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates and the danger of a deﬂationary spiral associated with it. There are, however, several ways to conduct an expansionary 
monetary policy in such a scenario; thus, by itself, the problem does not threaten ﬁnancial stability (see Goodfriend 2001).| 10  Commentary 293
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these losses have to be ﬁnanced somehow. Such a 
deviation from targeting seems justiﬁed to avoid 
the collapse of the ﬁnancial system. Of course, in 
such a scenario, the challenge would be to induce 
expectations that policy will return to its main goal 
of price stability in the medium term by outlining 
a forward-looking path for future policy actions.17 
In the current ﬁnancial crisis such concerns 
were initially pushed aside, as the problems in 
the ﬁnancial sector were accompanied by a sharp 
fall in aggregate demand. Deﬂation seemed to 
be a bigger threat than inﬂation arising from the 
bailout of ﬁnancial institutions. In the meantime, 
however, the threat of deﬂation has diminished 
and the focus has shifted to designing exit strat-
egies to prevent a spike in inﬂation that could 
unhinge inﬂation expectations. Since bringing 
down inﬂation expectations is very costly for the 
economy (see for example Canada’s experience 
when the targeting regime was introduced in 
the early 1990s), a central bank cannot afford to  
hesitate undoing its interventions after the ﬁnan-
cial system has stabilised, even though this might 
weaken the recovery in the real economy.
Summary
It is useful to summarize brieﬂy the lessons from 
the theoretical literature on inﬂation targeting 
regarding the question of if and to what degree 
a central bank should pursue other goals, such 
as output stabilization and exchange-rate and 
ﬁnancial stability. There are four main conclusions.
•    Even if there is a tradeoff with stabilizing 
output, controlling inﬂation should remain 
the overriding goal of monetary policy. Focus-
ing exclusively on inﬂation alleviates a com-
mitment problem that is complicated by the 
presence of private information for the central 
bank that the public cannot verify easily. It 
is also a robust description of optimal policy 
when a central bank faces uncertainty about 
the shocks and the structure of the economy.
•    An inﬂation target and an exchange-rate 
target are mutually exclusive, as the latter 
interferes with monetary independence. 
Nonetheless, inﬂation targeting naturally will 
take into account exchange-rate movements 
insofar as they have implications for 
aggregate demand and inﬂation pressures. 
To increase the importance of exchange-rate 
effects, one could  extend the domestic price 
index to directly include import prices or 
to have monetary policy react to currency 
misalignments. This approach is problematic, 
however, as it requires a clear understanding 
of the reasons import prices change or 
currencies become misaligned.
•    The optimal tradeoff with goals other than 
inﬂation can be accounted for largely through 
the design of the targeting regime – that is, 
the measure of inﬂation to target, at what 
level, and the time over which to achieve 
the target. Point targets are unlikely to be an 
appropriate policy prescription when a central 
bank has imperfect control over inﬂation and 
when its commitment to an optimal policy 
depends on its past decisions.
•    A key challenge for any targeting regime is 
how to take into account concerns about 
ﬁnancial stability. Recent events suggest a 
more proactive policy with respect to ﬁnancial 
market developments that is characterized 
by “leaning against the wind” in both 
boom and bust situations. Concerns about 
ﬁnancial stability can provide a reason for 
compromising price stability temporarily, 
as a central bank assumes the role either of 
a lender- or a market-maker-of-last-resort. 
Policy then needs to be forward looking and 
to indicate a commitment to restoring the 
inﬂation goal in the future.
17  Unfortunately, the consequences of a central bank acting as lender-of-last-resort or market-maker-of-last resort are not well understood in the 
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Are the Parameters of Canada’s 
Current Targeting Regime 
Appropriate?
In an inﬂation-targeting regime, price stability 
is commonly the only formal goal of monetary 
policy. Hence, the central parameter of the regime 
is some level or trend of a price index.18 Other 
considerations, such as stabilizing output, ﬁnancial 
stability, or the exchange rate, are usually taken 
into account when designing the details of the 
targeting regime. These details matter a great 
deal, as they determine the actual degree of policy 
discretion the central bank has. 
Any targeting regime is described by three 
broad parameters. First, there is a quantitative 
measure of the target that monetary policy is 
supposed to achieve. Second, there is the period 
of time and the circumstances under which 
the target is to be achieved. In the discussion 
that follows, the optimal degree of ﬂexibility, as 
described above, is implemented through these 
aspects of the regime. A third variable, however 
– how to enforce hitting the target – is equally 
important, but unfortunately often omitted in 
discussions. The remainder of this Commentary 
looks at how Canada’s targeting regime might be 
improved along these three dimensions.
Is a Band of 1-to-3 Percent Inﬂation 
Appropriate?
A central bank is given ﬂexibility mainly by 
allowing monetary policy to keep inﬂation within 
a band around the target. Such ﬂexibility gives 
the bank the freedom to take into account other 
variables and further strengthens inﬂation targeting 
by acknowledging that the bank has imperfect 
control over any measure of inﬂation. A larger 
value for average long-run inﬂation, however, 
weakens the case for low inﬂation. Similarly, 
a larger band gives more room for stabilizing 
output. Hence, leeway in both variables is linked 
inextricably to the degree of commitment of 
monetary policy.
The main concern here is that inﬂation might 
drift towards the upper end of the band. This 
corresponds to an inﬂationary bias in monetary 
policy arising from society’s pressure for more 
output growth. Based on the experience of inﬂa-
tionary periods after 1970, many economists 
therefore view violations of the band to be more 
likely at the upper bound than at the lower one. 
A targeting regime concerned with the optimal 
degree of commitment should thus emphasize the 
upper bound as a cap on inﬂation. After all, this 
is how to implement optimal monetary policy in 
a setting where political pressures to inﬂate and 
private information compromise a central bank’s 
credibility (see Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2005). 
It is worth emphasizing that a “cap” on inﬂa-
tion is understood here as a trigger for a policy 
response. Once inﬂation nears or reaches the 
upper bound, a policy reaction is required to 
prevent it from breaching the target band. In this 
sense, reaching the upper bound of the target 
severely limits the possibility for discrete policy 
action. There still can be violations of the band 
due to policy mistakes, but a cap forces the central 
bank into action to correct them, resulting in 
even more ﬁrmly anchored inﬂation expectations. 
Interestingly, such considerations are less prevalent 
at the lower end of the band, implying a subtle 
asymmetry between the two bounds. If there is 
a threat of deﬂation as inﬂation falls towards the 
lower end, central banks tend to do everything 
possible to raise inﬂation again. The brief deﬂa-
tion scare in the wake of the current ﬁnancial 
crisis demonstrated this quite vividly, with central 
banks reacting very aggressively to  the prospect of 
falling prices.
This is an important distinction from viewing 
the band as a mere conﬁdence interval for mone-
tary policy. In this view, monetary policy aims to 
keep inﬂation within the band most of the time. 
But misses can occur quite frequently without the 
central bank acknowledging past mistakes through 
appropriate tightening of policy. Having a band 
then undermines the main beneﬁt of anchoring 
inﬂation expectations by opening the backdoor 
18  A discussion is currently ongoing about whether Canada should adopt a price-level or an inﬂation target. Similarly, questions remain about 
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for too much discretion. Despite Canada’s impres-
sive overall record, over the past few years prior 
to the current recession there were some concerns 
that inﬂation resided more in the upper half of 
the band. Over the same time, some measures of 
inﬂation expectations also moved up considerably 
towards 3 percent (look back at Figure 2).19
These concerns might be compounded by 
allowing considerable volatility in inﬂation when 
the band is too large. Ideally, one would have a 
narrow band that has an upper bound very close 
to zero. There are several arguments against such 
a conclusion, ranging from an upward bias in the 
measurement of inﬂation to the fact that nominal 
wages cannot easily be adjusted downwards. The 
most pressing issue, however, is that zero average 
inﬂation increases the risk of a prolonged deﬂa-
tion as nominal interest rates get too close to zero 
and cannot become negative. Nonetheless, such 
a scenario, often described as a zero lower-bound 
problem, should occur only in extreme circum-
stances, which, in any case, require special policy 
considerations (see below).20 
Given the current regime in Canada, a more 
conservative stance on monetary policy seems 
appropriate, suggesting both to lower the band 
and to focus more on the upper bound. The strat-
egy of the European Central Bank could serve as a 
guideline, even though it does not explicitly refer 
to inﬂation targeting. Hence, capping inﬂation 
at 2 percent with the understanding of keeping 
inﬂation on average close to this upper bound 
might be an improvement over the current band. 
This stance would reinforce Canada’s focus on low 
inﬂation and lead to a more aggressive stance on 
inﬂationary pressures than currently is the case.21
Such a change in design would have two impor-
tant by-products. First, it might make a shift from 
inﬂation to price-level targeting less important, 
since capping inﬂation to some degree would 
force the Bank of Canada to undo past policy 
mistakes; after all, a policy trigger is likely to 
reverse inﬂation sharply and quickly. Second, the 
Bank would be less likely to take for granted its 
credibility with respect to low inﬂation, which by 
itself could well lead to a more proactive approach 
in dealing with developments in ﬁnancial markets 
and thus would aid ﬁnancial stability. 
What Is the Optimal Time Period in which 
to Achieve the Target? 
A more conservative stance on inﬂation need not 
restrict ﬂexibility. The time period for achieving 
the inﬂation goal serves as an auxiliary parameter 
to retain some ﬂexibility in targeting inﬂation. 
Targeting regimes traditionally have used a medium-
term horizon (say, two years), reﬂecting mainly 
operational reasons, such as imperfect control over 
inﬂation or the lag between a policy decision and its 
effect on inﬂation and the real economy.
Ideally, the horizon should be chosen to reﬂect 
an optimal degree of ﬂexibility. In general, the 
longer the period in which to achieve the target 
the larger the degree of ﬂexibility (see Svensson 
1997a). Furthermore, one can also use the time 
horizon to realign the incentives for a central bank 
that cannot credibly commit to optimal policy 
as it faces pressure to stimulate the economy.22 
Hence, if stabilizing inﬂation is the main concern, 
a shorter horizon tends to be more appropriate. In 
addition, a short horizon avoids giving policymak-
19  In this context, Laidler and Banerjee (2008) also make a case for strengthening the upper bound.
20  In a deﬂation (or low inﬂation) scenario, negative nominal interest rates might be required to achieve a sufﬁciently negative real interest rate 
to stabilize output at its efﬁcient level. Goodfriend (2001) discusses taxing bank reserves and aggressive open market operations as possible 
ways to achieve such negative interest rates. 
21  The Bank of England also emphasizes the upper bound of its inﬂation-target range, as violations of this bound require the governor to 
explain to the chancellor of the exchequer the reasons for the violation and, more important, to outline the policy actions that are being 
considered to bring inﬂation back within the band. Hence, an upper bound helps to maintain the independence of the central bank against 
political pressure. Indeed, the European Central Bank has faced immense political pressure over the past few years to conduct a more active 
monetary policy, but has been able to ward off these demands by referring to its mandate to respect an upper bound on inﬂation. While 
these upper bounds might have caused a somewhat slower response on the part of both the European Central Bank and the Bank of England 
to the current ﬁnancial crisis, they certainly did not prevent sharp cuts in interest rates or even a temporary violation of the bound.
22  Smets (2003) studies the problem of using the horizon and the target variable — price level versus inﬂation — to induce a central bank to 
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ers an incentive to defer unpopular decisions in 
the hope that future developments will eliminate 
the need to make them.
Nonetheless, there are several arguments for 
choosing a longer time horizon. Some circum-
stances might require more inertial responses 
in interest rates, implying a policy that is more 
drawn out. Similarly, policy actions from the past 
often inﬂuence current policy decisions, so that 
it becomes optimal to deviate from the target for 
some time. These considerations gain in impor-
tance when targeting the price level, rather than 
inﬂation, or when extraordinarily large shocks hit 
the economy.
There is a tendency for the optimal horizon 
to be longer when targeting the price level, since 
such a regime shifts volatility towards output (see 
Smets 2003). Since past deviations from the target 
are not bygones, missing the target has to been 
undone over time. This accentuates the question 
of the optimal horizon, as undoing such mistakes 
puts additional strain on the public acceptability 
of the targeting regime. Sharp corrections at the 
cost of temporary, but signiﬁcant, output losses 
simply might not be acceptable politically. To the 
contrary, longer horizons can allow for deviations 
to accumulate, making it tougher to return to the 
target and, as a result, might damage the system’s 
credibility.
A large shock, such as a crisis in the ﬁnancial 
system or a signiﬁcant change in commodity 
prices, might require a temporary shift away from 
price stability. Rather than abandon the target 
altogether, a softening of the horizon generally is 
more benign. Such an event-contingent length-
ening of the horizon allows for additional ﬂex-
ibility when it is most needed.23 For example, 
it would allow the central bank to stabilize the 
ﬁnancial system in times of a crisis by assuming 
losses and monetizing them later on. Nonetheless, 
event contingency endangers the very nature of a 
targeting regime unless checks are put in place to 
prevent its frequent use. One solution might be to 
require the central bank to justify any lengthen-
ing of the horizon in response to an extraordinary 
event. The bank should also have to make such 
deviations conditional on committing to a path 
for future policy that leads it back to the target. 
The horizon for targeting inﬂation in Canada 
likely would need to be adjusted along these lines 
if a more conservative level of inﬂation were to be 
adopted. An inﬂation cap at 2 percent can work 
well with the usual horizon of one to two years, 
as long as it is ﬂexible enough in the wake of large 
shocks. Finally, such event-contingent ﬂexibility 
could introduce moral hazard in ﬁnancial markets, 
but this should be less of a concern if policy 
becomes more proactive in response to the adop-
tion of an inﬂation cap.
How Should the Target Be Enforced? 
The success of inﬂation targeting is a function 
of its enforcement. Most regimes do not have a 
formal or clearly deﬁned means of enforcement in 
the sense that they specify rewards for meeting the 
target or punishment for violating it. Still, there 
might be implicit enforcement. A conservative, 
low-inﬂation target in the form of a cap with a 
tight, downward band would aid the independence 
of a central bank simply by mandating less room 
for ﬂexibility. Having a cap on inﬂation is pivotal 
here, as the targeting band is not seen as a mere 
conﬁdence interval for appropriate monetary 
policy. Breaching the upper bound would signal 
a clear violation of the mandate. Once a central 
bank’s credibility has been damaged, inﬂation 
expectations would change. As such, a change 
would be costly to correct, and the bank likely 
would be less tempted to conduct short-run 
discretionary policy.
23  The gold standard in place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be understood as a monetary policy regime with very little 
discretion. It was sometimes abandoned in response to events such as wars or ﬁnancial and economic crises. Such event contingency did not 
necessarily cause problems in normal times, as people perceived a strong commitment of policymakers to returning to the standard once any 
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A simple framework such as the one currently 
used in Canada also supports credibility, as 
assessing the commitment to the inﬂation target 
is relatively straightforward. One can observe 
violations of the band and assess whether these 
were caused by occasional policy mistakes or are 
pathological.24 In principle, optimal policy could 
be fully described based on an empirically esti-
mated, reasonable model of the economy, assump-
tions about the shocks the economy is facing, 
and forecasts of policy-relevant variables. This 
could be translated into a value for the policy 
instrument, such as the overnight rate in Canada. 
Notwithstanding this possibility, there is wide 
agreement that, in reality, such an approach is 
counterproductive: it is hard to communicate the 
approach and it is still possible to fail to hit the 
target, given the uncertainty regarding the precise 
nature of the shocks or the economy’s structure.
Nonetheless, it would be possible to improve 
the enforcement of Canada’s targeting regime by 
increasing the transparency of policy decisions and 
communicating them better to the public. Once 
ﬂexibility has been introduced into the targeting 
horizon, it is essential for a central bank to publish 
a detailed forecast of inﬂation over a particular 
horizon. This is equivalent to pinning down a 
transition path for future interest rates so that, 
over this horizon, the forecast of inﬂation hits the 
target. It therefore would commit policy implic-
itly to particular future decisions conditional on 
current information.25
Such inﬂation forecast targeting with a ﬂexible 
horizon would fully specify conditional future 
policy actions, given current and past circum-
stances, and would clarify the history dependence 
of future decisions and anchor inﬂation expec-
tations even more effectively. But it also would 
signal a future policy stance that would be condi-
tional on other information as it became avail-
able. Interestingly, the Bank of Canada recently 
used such a strategy when announcing to keep 
its policy rate at the lower bound for a certain 
period of time. As already pointed out, such a 
procedure might be indispensable, for example, 
to implement a more proactive policy in response 
to ﬁnancial market developments that requires 
the cross-checking of productivity variables with 
credit or monetary indicators (see Issing 2008). In 
short, forecast targeting would increase the costs 
of discretionary policy by making transparent any 
deviations from such a history-dependent and 
conditional path. Once the public detects devia-
tions, they become self-defeating, which would 
restrain the central bank and implicitly enforce 
the targeting regime.
Conclusions
When Canada’s inﬂation-targeting regime comes 
up for renewal in 2011, there is a danger that 
policymakers will have become complacent 
about its past successes. Recent increases in and 
subsequent diminishing of inﬂation demonstrate 
the public pressures the Bank of Canada faces, 
with many calling for it to focus more consciously 
on output and growth. As inﬂation targeting is 
often deﬁned as “constrained discretion,” there is a 
natural tendency for the Bank to yield to political 
inﬂuence and pursue a suboptimal policy that 
overstimulates the economy relative to its potential 
and is too permissive of inﬂation.
The upcoming review, which will focus on 
ﬁne-tuning the regime, should reiterate the Bank’s 
commitment to low and stable inﬂation and aim to 
tighten the targeting regime along two lines. First, 
greater emphasis should be placed on the upper 
bound of the target band by interpreting it as a cap 
on inﬂation, violations of which should trigger a 
policy response. Second, the upper bound should 
be lowered from its current level of 3 percent to 2 
percent which would reinforce the commitment 
to low and stable inﬂation in Canada. Indeed, in 
its original design the target was supposed to be 
24  The Bank of Canada usually outlines why the current policy decision is compatible with meeting the inﬂation target in the future.
25  Hitting the target with its inﬂation forecast is the best a central bank can achieve (see Svensson 1997a). Indeed, Giannoni and Woodford 
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“below 2 percent” from 1995 onwards.
A neglected area of the current regime is the 
way in which it communicates its policy stance. If 
the regime were to move closer to price stability 
with an inﬂation cap, it necessarily would place 
more importance on the need to clarify how the 
Bank of Canada takes into account other goals, 
such as stabilizing output, in its day-to-day deci-
sions and in special situations that could justify 
a temporary deviation from the cap. Publishing 
inﬂation forecasts with every decision would help 
the Bank to outline its policy stance relative to the 
overriding goal of low inﬂation. Transparency and 
credibility would be further enhanced if the Bank 
were to explain how past, current, and future 
circumstances pin down a conditional path for 
future overnight rates. 
What is needed, then, is a two-pronged approach 
to reﬁning the current inﬂation-targeting regime; 
one that emphasizes the formal inﬂation goal 
more heavily, so that actual inﬂation can serve 
as a crude test of how well the Bank of Canada 
does its job, while improving the communication 
of policy decisions in order to increase transpar-
ency and more ﬁrmly anchor inﬂation expecta-
tions. Most important, such an approach, without 
endangering the Bank’s long-term commitment to 
low inﬂation, would give the Bank the room for 
additional ﬂexibility when it is most needed: in 
extreme situations such as ﬁnancial instability or 
large swings in the exchange rate.| 16  Commentary 293
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In recent years, thinking about monetary policy 
has been heavily inﬂuenced by so-called new 
neoclassical synthesis, the hallmark of which is to 
have a real model of the economy that describes 
its efﬁcient evolution as well as imperfections, 
such as price or wage rigidities that cause it to 
deviate from this trend in response to shocks. 
In this model, monetary policy is perceived as 
mitigating such imperfections in order to allow 
the economy to evolve efﬁciently.26
For illustrative purposes, the basic elements 
of this approach can be described by outlining 
what is often called a “new Keynesian model” of 
monetary policy, referring to particular assump-
tions about the real economy and its frictions.27 
The goals of monetary policy are explicitly 
derived from the preferences for consumption 
and leisure of the households that make up the 
economy. Using an appropriate approximation, 
one obtains a  criterion for optimal monetary 
policy that is often described by a loss function 
of the form




which penalizes deviations of inﬂation  0 and the 
output gap xt from their respective targets. Such 
a function has several important characteristics. 
First, it takes trend inﬂation and the trend 
of output in the form of an output target as 
given. This acknowledges the beneﬁts of low 
inﬂation and the fact that monetary policy 
cannot inﬂuence the long-run prospects for 
growth in the light of low inﬂation. Second, it 
is forward looking in the sense of minimizing 
today’s expected losses and those of the indeﬁnite 
future weighted by a discount factor, 0 .Third, it 
weights the importance of variations in inﬂation 
relative to those in the output gap according to a 
parameter, 00A positive value of this parameter 
implies ﬂexible targeting, in the sense that there 
are goals other than inﬂation.
This type of loss function and its parameters are 
derived within the context of a model economy 
that yields a relationship between aggregate supply 
and aggregate demand. This relationship also can 
be obtained within the model from decisions of 
households and ﬁrms, where one makes explicit 
the frictions that cause these decisionmakers to 
respond inefﬁciently to shocks. Importantly, all 
parameters (denoted by  0000          can  be  
can be estimated from data, as they correspond to 
actual parameters of the model’s micro founda-
tions. The aggregate demand equation is given by
     χt – Et χt + 1 – σ(it – Etπt + 1 – rn
t )
where the term in brackets refers to deviations of 
the actual real interest rate – the nominal interest 
rate  0, less expected inﬂation – from the one 
associated in an economy without distortions, 
also called the natural rate of interest 00 ,  and 
E  represents expectations for these variables at 
time t. The policy variable for the central bank 
is a short-term nominal interest rate, and supply 
and demand shocks are captured in ﬂuctuations 
of the natural rate. The aggregate supply 
relationship is given by what is classiﬁed as a 
“new Keynesian Phillips curve” of the
 
“new Keynesian Phillips curve” of the form
         
which relates inﬂation to the output gap, 
expectations about future inﬂation, and what 
is sometimes labelled a “cost-push shock.” This 
shock causes ﬂuctuations in the distortions 
that monetary policy tries to remove without 
inﬂuencing the trend growth in the economy.
Optimal policy is described by choosing 
values for inﬂation and the output gap in order 
horizons. Practically, this boils down to specifying a transition path conditional on current information.
26  The outline of the approach presented here borrows heavily from Gaspar and Smets (2002) and Woodford (2003).
β, λ, and below κ, σ)
Appendix: A Welfare-based Approach to Inﬂation Targeting
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to minimize the loss function, while taking as 
given the Phillips curve as a single constraint. 
The actual policy instrument, or short-term 
interest rate 0 , that implements an equilib-
rium is then set such as to fulﬁll the aggregate 
demand equation.
One can show that, for this model, both 
inﬂation and the output gap are functions of 
the cost-push shock. Without such a shock, 
there would be no conﬂict between the two 
goals; perfectly stabilizing inﬂation also stabi-
lizes output. Furthermore, it can be shown 
easily that there is an incentive for the central 
bank to change its decision every period, given 
the realization of the cost-push shock. Hence, 
a commitment problem arises, as the opti-
mal monetary policy takes into account that it 
can inﬂuence expectations about future inﬂa-
tion when committing to future policy actions. 
Without such a commitment, the central bank 
cannot inﬂuence expectations, as it will reopti-
mize its loss function every period. Compared to 
the optimal policy, this leads to too much stabili-
zation of the output gap relative to inﬂation.28
Interestingly, the optimal policy with 
commitment can be described by a simple opti-
mal targeting rule given by
This rule implies a reaction function for the 
central bank to set its nominal interest rate as 
a function of current inﬂation and the output 
gap.29 This reaction function is often called a 
“Taylor rule.”30  Whether nominal interest rates 
are actually set according to such a simple or 
modiﬁed Taylor rule depends on the particular 
model describing aggregate demand.
This description is remarkably robust in the 
sense that it emerges in a variety of models that 
alter the aggregate supply and demand relation-
ship in the economy. Such changes simply tend 
to inﬂuence the deﬁnition of the inﬂation vari-
able one uses and the parameter values one esti-
mates for the targeting rule. The key observation 
of this rule is that optimal policy does not keep 
inﬂation always at its target – here, zero. As long 
as 00 is positive, it is optimal to let inﬂation vary 
in response to shocks that move the output gap 
over time. The rule is state dependent and targets 
inﬂation in a ﬂexible way. Finally, as last period’s 
output gap matters, the policy is also history 
dependent: it takes into account not only current 
shocks but also past shocks to the economy.
27  Assuming a different model of the economy leads not only to different loss functions, but also to different relationships between inﬂation 
and output that describe equilibrium in the economy as a function of policy.
28  One could also introduce the classic version of the commitment problem — an inﬂationary bias — by targeting an inefﬁcient level of output 
above trend.
29  Woodford (2003) points out that this policy rule is also “timeless” — that is, it does not depend on the time that has elapsed since an initial 
period when a long-run policy rule was adopted.
it
λ| 18  Commentary 293
C.D. Howe Institute   
Athey, S., A. Atkeson, and P. Kehoe. 2005. “The Optimal 
Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy.” Econometrica 
73 (5): 1431-1475.
Bank of Canada. 2006. “Renewal of the Inﬂation-Control 
Target.” Background Information. Ottawa: Bank of 
Canada. November.
Bernanke, B., and F. Mishkin. 1997. “Inﬂation Targeting: 
A New Framework for Monetary Policy?” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11 (2): 97-116.
Blanchard, O., and J. Simon. 2001. “The Long and Large 
Decline in US Output Variability.” Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity 1: 135-64. 
Canzoneri, M. 1985. “Monetary Policy Games and the Role 
of Private Information.” American Economic Review 75 
(5): 1056-70.
Christensen, I., F. Dion, and C. Reid. 2004. “Real Return 
Bonds, Inﬂation Expectations and the Break-Even 
Inﬂation Rate.” Working Paper 2004-43. Ottawa: Bank 
of Canada.
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno. 2007. “Two 
Reasons Why Money and Credit May Be Useful 
in Monetary Policy.” Department of Economics, 
Northwestern University. Manuscript.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler. 2001. “Optimal 
Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed Economies: An 
Integrated Approach.” American Economic Review 91 
(2): 248-52.
Corsetti, G., and P. Pesenti. 2005. “International Dimensions 
of Monetary Policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 
281-305.
Detken, C., and F. Smets. 2004. “Asset Price Booms and 
Monetary Policy.” Working Paper 364. Frankfurt am 
Main: European Central Bank.
Devereaux, M., and J. Yetman. 2003. “Price Setting and 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Theory and Evidence.” 
In Price Adjustment and Monetary Policy: Proceedings of a 
Conference Held at the Bank of Canada. Ottawa: Bank of 
Canada.
Ehrmann, M., and F. Smets. 2003. “Uncertain Potential 
Output: Implications for Monetary Policy.” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 27 (9): 1611-38.
Engel, C. 2008. “Currency Misalignments and Optimal 
Monetary Policy: A Reexamination.” Department 
of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Manuscript.
Gali, J., and T. Monacelli. 2005. “Monetary Policy and 
Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy.” 
Review of Economic Studies 72 (252): 707-34.
Gaspar V. and F. Smets 2002. “Monetary Policy, Price 
Stability and Output Gap Stabilisation.” International 
Finance 5: 193-202.
Giannoni, M. 2002. “Does Model Uncertainty Justify 
Caution? Robust Optimal Monetary Policy in a 
Forward-Looking Model.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 6 
(1): 111-44.
Giannoni, M., and M. Woodford. 2004. “Optimal Inﬂation-
Targeting Rules.” In The Inﬂation-Targeting Debate, 
edited by B. Bernanke and M. Woodford. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Goodfriend, M. 2001. “Financial Stability, Deﬂation, and 
Monetary Policy.” Monetary and Economic Studies 19 
(S1): 143-67.
Issing, O. 2008. “In Search of Monetary Stability: The 
Evolution of Monetary Policy.” Basle: Bank for 
International Settlements.
Laidler, D., and R. Banerjee. 2008. “Unstable Foundations: 
Asset Markets, Inﬂation Targets, and Canada’s 2011 
Policy Choices.” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 278. 
Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
Murray, J. 2006. “Future Trends in Inﬂation Targeting: A 
Canadian Perspective.” Ottawa: Bank of Canada.
Nason, J., and G. Smith. 2007. “Great Moderation(s) and 
US Interest Rates: Unconditional Evidence.” Working 
Paper 1140. Kingston, ON: Queen’s University, 
Department of Economics.
Parkin, M. 2009. “What Is the Ideal Monetary Policy 
Regime? Improving the Bank of Canada’s Inﬂation-
targeting Regime.” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 
279. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. January.
Ragan, C. 2005. “The Exchange Rate and Canadian 
Inﬂation Targeting.” Working Paper 2005-34. Ottawa: 
Bank of Canada.
Reis, R. 2006. “A Cost-of-Living Dynamic Price Index, 
with an Application to Indexing Retirement Accounts.” 
Princeton University. Manuscript.
Robson, W. 2009. “To the Next Level: From Gold Standard 
to Inﬂation Targets – To Price Stability?” C.D. Howe 
Institute Commentary 285. Toronto: C.D. Howe 
Institute. March.
Smets, F. 2003. “Maintaining Price Stability: How Long Is 
the Medium Term?” Journal of Monetary Economics 50 
(6): 1293-1309.
Smets, F., and R. Wouters. 2007. “Shocks and Frictions in 
US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach.” 
American Economic Review 97 (3): 586-607.
ReferencesCommentary 293    | 19
Independent • Reasoned • Relevant    C.D. Howe Institute
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary© is a periodic analysis of, and commentary on, current public policy issues. Barry Norris and  
James Fleming edited the manuscript; Heather Vilistus prepared it for publication. As with all Institute publications, the views expressed 
here are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of the Institute’s members or Board of Directors. Quotation with 
appropriate credit is permissible.
To order this publication please contact: Renouf Publishing Company Limited, 5369 Canotek Road, Ottawa, Ontario K1J 9J3; or the  
C.D. Howe Institute, 67 Yonge St., Suite 300, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1J8. The full text of this publication is also available on the Institute’s 
website at www.cdhowe.org.
Smith, G. 2009. “The Missing Links: Better Measures of 
Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations in Canada.” C.D. 
Howe Institute Commentary 287. Toronto: C.D. Howe 
Institute. April.
Svensson, L. 1997a. “Inﬂation Forecast Targeting: 
Implementing and Monitoring Inﬂation Targets.” 
European Economic Review 41 (6): 1111-46.
––– 1997b. “Optimal Inﬂation Targets, Conservative Central 
Banks, and Linear Inﬂation Contracts.” American 
Economic Review 87 (1): 98-114.
––– 1999. “Inﬂation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 43 (3): 607-54.
Taylor, J. 2001. “The Role of the Exchange Rate in 
Monetary-Policy Rules.” American Economic Review 91 
(2): 263-67.
Woodford, M. 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a 
Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.| 20  Commentary 293
NOTESRECENT C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS
SUPPORT THE INSTITUTE
For more information on supporting the C.D. Howe Institute’s vital policy work, through charitable giving or membership, 
please go to www.cdhowe.org or call 416-865-1904. Learn more about the Institute’s activities and how to make a donation at 
the same time. You will receive a tax receipt for your gift. 
A REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENT, NONPARTISAN RESEARCH
The C.D. Howe Institute’s reputation for independent, reasoned and relevant public policy research of the highest quality is  
its chief asset, and underpins the credibility and effectiveness of its work. Independence and nonpartisanship are core Institute 
values that inform its approach to research, guide the actions of its professional staff and limit the types of ﬁnancial  
contributions that the Institute will accept.
For our full Independence and Nonpartisanship Policy go to www.cdhowe.org.
Commentary 293    | 21
August 2009  Johnson, David. “Ontario’s Best Public Schools Between 2005/06 and 2007/08: An Update to 
Signposts of Success (2005).” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
August 2009  Busby, Colin, Alexandre Laurin, and David Grey. “Back to Basics: Restoring Equity and  
Efﬁciency in the EI Program.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2009  Siklos, Pierre L. As Good As It Gets? The International Dimension to Canada’s Monetary Policy 
Strategy Choices. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 292.
July 2009  Busby, Colin, and William B.P. Robson. “Equipping Ourselves in Tough Times: Canada’s  
Improved Business Investment Performance.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2009  Banerjee, Robin, and William B.P Robson. “Faster, Younger, Richer? The Fond Hope and 
Sobering Reality of Immigration’s Impact on Canada’s Demographic and Economic Future.” 
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 117.
June 2009  Crow, John. “A Bank for All Seasons: The Bank of Canada and the Regulatory Challenge.” 
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
June 2009  Busby, Colin, and Alexandre Laurin. “Getting Off the Rollercoaster: A Stable Funding  
Framework for the EI Program” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
June 2009  Doern, Bruce, and Robert Morrison. Canada’s Nuclear Crossroads: Steps to a Viable Nuclear 
Energy Industry. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 290.
May 2009  Steele, Marion, and François Des Rosiers. Building Affordable Rental Housing in Unaffordable 
Cities: A Canadian Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 289.
May 2009  Dachis, Benjamin. “Low-Carbon Fuel Standards: Driving in the Wrong Direction.”  
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
May 2009  Moussaly-Sergieh, Karim, and François Vaillancourt. “Extra Earning Power: The Financial 
Returns to University Education in Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
May 2009  de Oliveira, Claire. Good Health to All: Reducing Health Inequalities among Children in  
High- and Low-Income Canadian Families. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 288.
April 2009  Busby, Colin, and William B.P Robson. “Near Hits and Big Misses: Canada’s 2009 Fiscal  
Accountability Rankings.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 117.
April 2009  Laurin, Alexandre. “Débâcle à la Caisse : Que faire avec le Régime de rentes du Québec?”  
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
April 2009  Smith, Gregor. The Missing Links: Better Measures of Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations in 
Canada. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 287.C
.
D
.
 
H
o
w
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
6
7
 
Y
o
n
g
e
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
,
 
O
n
t
a
r
i
o
M
5
E
 
1
J
8
C
a
n
a
d
i
a
n
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
#
4
0
0
0
8
8
4
8